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Macao's Return: Issues and Concerns
LIUTING WANG*

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 5, 1998, a board was unveiled in Beijing's Tiananmen
Square' that counted "down the number of days and seconds

before Macao's return." 2

After over 400 years of Portuguese

3
control, Macao will be returned to China on December 20, 1999.
Because of its small size and economy, Macao's return will not
receive the media attention and international concern that Hong
Kong's return received two years ago. Nonetheless, Macao's
return is a significant historical event for China. Macao is the last
Chinese territory occupied by foreign powers. 4
Chinese

* B.A., Philosophy Lanzhou University (1984); M.A., Western Philosophy, Nanking
University (1987); J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (1999);
Assistant Professor, Nanking University (1987-1989); Visiting Research Fellow at the
State University of New York, Albany (1989-1990).
The author thanks Professors David Thomas and Douglas Parker of the J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University for their comments and
suggestions and his classmates, Craig Anderson and Robert Payne, for their help in
proofreading this Article.
The Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review was unable
to obtain English translations for certain Chinese source material cited in this Article.
Accordingly, the Review relies on the author's representations as to the accuracy of these
sources.
1. Committee Preparesfor Macao's Return, BEIJING REV., May 25-31, 1998, at 5.
2. Id. Macao is also spelled "Macau." The Chinese Government uses "Macao" to
be consistent with the Mandarin pronunciation. The author uses "Macao" throughout this
Article, but sometimes "Macau" may appear in the citations.
3. See Basic Law of Macao, Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, at I [hereinafter Basic Law of
Macao]. The Basic Law of Macao was adopted at the First Session of the Eighth National
People's Congress on March 31, 1993. See id. See also Teresa Poole Pecking, China
Focuses on Next Great Prize- Taiwan, INDEP. (London), Mar. 24, 1997, at 12 (noting that
December 20, 1999 "will mark an end to foreign government of claimed Chinese
territory").
4. See Richard Halloran, All Asia and the West Will Feel the Transfer's
Reverberations, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Neuilly-sur-Seine, Fr.), June 30, 1997, at 10,
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Government officials hope that Macao's return will demonstrate
to the international community Macao's commitment to the "one
country, two systems" theory, 5 and open the possibility of the
6
peaceful reunification of Taiwan with Mainland China.
In contrast to the protracted animosity between China and
Britain over Hong Kong, both China and Portugal characterize the
Macao transition as smooth and cooperative. 7
Indeed, few
emotionally charged issues exist in the Macao transition that
compare to the quarrels between Beijing and London over the
governorship appointment and the legitimacy of the Hong Kong
provisional legislature. 8 Beijing and Lisbon, nonetheless, do
dispute such issues as localizing law and civil services, designating
an official language, controlling gang violence, and deploying
troops. 9 Potential disputes may also arise from the interpretation
of the Basic Law of the Macao Special Administration Region of
the People's Republic of China (Macao Basic Law), Macao
autonomy, judicial independence, and protecting human rights.
Democratic observers and human rights groups express concern
that Macao may be more vulnerable to human rights abuses than
was Hong Kong due to its small size, its anonymity within the
international community, the deeply rooted Chinese influences,
and the weak grass-roots democratic forces in Macao society.1 0
This Article discusses the current disputes between China and
Portugal by analyzing the issues and concerns in the context of the
Macao Basic Law and the Joint Declaration of the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao (Joint
Declaration). 11 The Macao transition ultimately involves two

availablein LEXIS, World Library, Iht File.
5. See generally Cooperation Vowed on Macao Handover, BEIJING REV., May 1117, 1998, at 5.

6. See Qian: China to Deepen Reform, Widen Opening-Up, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(New York, N.Y.), Sept. 24, 1997, availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Arcnws File.

7. See Cooperation Vowed on Macao Handover,supra note 5, at 5.
8. See generally Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 301, 321-324 (1996).

9. See China Blasts Portugal over Macau's Handover, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
(Paris), Nov. 20, 1998, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.

10. See generally Amnesty International Urges Macau Leaders to Ensure Human
Rights, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), July 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc

Library, Allnws File.
11. See generally Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of
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issues: first, how the Macao Basic Law is interpreted and
implemented; and second, whether the Chinese Government will
honor its commitments, as embodied in the Macao Basic Law, to
maintain the existing legal, political, and economic systems for fifty
years. To maintain Macao's stability and prosperity, the Chinese
Government must recognize Macao's unique history and culture,
accept the differences between the Macanese and Chinese legal
and social systems, and respect Macao's autonomy, judicial
independence, and its people's human rights, in accordance with
the Macao Basic Law.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the history of Macao's
separation from China. Part III provides an overview of the
Macao Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, which are the two
primary legal documents governing the transition process and
Macao's future. Part IV discusses various issues and concerns
arising from the Joint Declaration, including deploying Chinese
troops in Macao, localizing law and civil services, maintaining
social order and public security, appropriating the fiscal reserve,
and designating an official language. Part V focuses on the
interpretation of some of the Macao Basic Law's critical provisions
and their potential impact on Macao. Part VI concludes that the
Chinese Government must recognize the historical, legal, and
cultural differences between China and Macao, respect Macao's
culture and legal tradition, and resolve the differences in the spirit
of the Basic Law.
II. MACAO'S SEPARATION
Macao is a free seaport, located outside of the Pearl River,
west of Hong Kong. It includes the Macao Peninsula, Taipa Island
and Coloane Island. Covering 20.96 square kilometers, Macao is
but one sixty-third the size of Hong Kong. 12 Its current population
of 450,000 consists of ninety-six percent ethnic Chinese, three

China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao, Apr.
13, 1987, P.R.C.-Port. [hereinafter Joint Declaration], reprinted in JAW-LING JOANNE
CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES
NO. 4, SETTLEMENT OF THE MACAO ISSUE: DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF BEIJING'S
NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR (WITH TEXT OF 1887 PROTOCOL AND 1987 DECLARATION)

29 (1988) [hereinafter CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS].

12. See Macau Government Information Services, Macau (visited Nov. 3, 1999)
<http://www.macau.gov.mo> [hereinafter Macau Government Homepage].
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percent Portuguese, and one percent other ethnicities. 13 Among
Macao's population, about ninety-six percent speak Chinese as
14

their first language.
Unlike Hong Kong, the Chinese influence in Macao is evident
through the Chinese version of its history and culture. According
to Chinese scholars, in 1553, the Portuguese bribed corrupt
Chinese officials to obtain permission to use Macao to dry their
goods damaged in sea storms, and then refused to leave. 15 From
1573 to 1849, the Portuguese paid rent to the Chinese Government
and acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Macao. 1 6 Following
the 1840 Opium War, Portugal and Britain conspired to force the
corrupt Qing Government to sign the 1887 Lisbon Treaty 17 that
allowed the Portuguese to permanently manage and reside in
Macao. 18 The treaty prohibited Portugal from transferring Macao
to another country without first obtaining China's approval. 19 The
20
Chinese knew that the British wanted to claim Macao.
Therefore, with respect to the treaty, China never technically
relinquished Macao's sovereignty. In fact, from the Chinese
perspective, Macao is within Chinese sovereignty and should not
be considered a colony. 2 1 Some Macao historians share similar
views.

22

13. See Chinese and Westerners Living Together in Macao, WORLDSOURCES, INC.,
EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 18, 1999, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Curnws File. See also Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12,
Geography and Population Section.
14. See Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, Geography and Population
Section.
15. See HONGJIAN HUANG, MACAO HISTORY 49 (Hong Kong Commercial Publ'g
1987).
16. See id. at 65.
17. See Protocol Between Portugal and China Respecting the Relations Between the
Two Countries, Mar. 26, 1887, P.R.C.-Port. [hereinafter Protocol Between Portugal and
China], reprintedin CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note 11, at 28.
18. See id.
19. See id. Article III states that "Portugal engages never to alienate Macau and
dependencies without agreement with China." Id.
20. See generally Protocol Between Portugal and China art. III, reprinted in CHANG,
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note 11, at 28 (declaring that "Portugal engages never to
alienate Macau and dependencies without agreement with China."). Possibly to prevent
Great Britain from taking Macao, the Chinese Government stipulated, in the Protocol,
that Portugal must obtain Chinese approval before alienating Macao.
21. See HONGJIAN HUANG, supra note 15, at 198.
22.

1987).

See WINKUAN HUANG, PONDERING ON MACAO HISTORY 36 (Macao Star Press
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In contrast, the western version of Macao's history is
different. French Chinese expert Paul Pelliot believes the
The
Portuguese first discovered and colonized Macao.23
Portuguese view, on the other hand, proffers that the Chinese
Government gave Macao to Portugal as a reward for its efforts in
fighting pirates. 24 In 1564 the Portuguese received a year tax-free
and a "golden chop" for assisting the Chinese in crushing a mutiny
in Guangdong Province - a fact that supports the Portuguese
view. 25 Chinese scholars believe Portugal used this event to justify
its occupation of Macao. 26 The Macao Government now agrees
27
that "it was never a colony in the strictest sense of the word.
The Portuguese Government formally renounced all of its
overseas colonies and territories after the 1974 Portuguese
Revolution. 28 In 1979, Portugal restored diplomatic relations with
China and explicitly recognized Macao as a Chinese territory. 29 In
1987, the two countries signed the Joint Declaration, stating that
China will take over Macao on December 20, 1999.30 In 1993, the
Chinese National People's Congress promulgated the Macao Basic
Law and established the Macao Special Administrative Region
31
(MSAR) under the theory of "one country, two systems."
According to the Macao Basic Law, Macao will maintain its
system for fifty years and enjoy a high level of
current capitalist
32
autonomy.
The Chinese Government believes that Macao's return
33
should be handled differently than was Hong Kong's return.
23. See HONGJIAN HUANG, supra note 15, at 27-28.
24. See C.K. Lau, History Simmers in the Last Colony, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Quarry Bay, H.K.), Dec. 20, 1997, at 17, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
25. See HONGJIAN HUANG, supra note 15, at 55-56.
26. See id.
27. Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, More than Four Centuries of
History Section.
28. See Xinhua Begins Question and Answer Series 'ABC's' of Macao SAR Basic
Law, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORP. SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS (Reading,
Eng.), Apr. 1, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Curnws File.
29. See id.
30. See HONGJIAN HUANG, supra note 15, at 198-199.
31. Joint Declaration para. 2, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note
11, at 29.
32. See Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 5, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at I. See also Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, More than Four
Centuries of History Section.
33. See generally Macau Plans Easy Transition from Portugal to China, NIKKEI
WEEKLY (New York, N.Y.), Jan. 27, 1997, at 25.
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Because of Macao's unique history, however, the differences in
handling the return may not be significant. Macao differs from
Hong Kong in size, economy, demography, and history, giving its
return certain distinctive characteristics. For example, Chinese
presence may have reduced Portuguese influence in Macao. 34 The
Chinese Government, however, must recognize the distinctive
35
legal system and social customs that have evolved in Macao.
Furthermore, the international community accepts Macao as a
separate legal entity, rather than merely a part of China or
Portugal.36 Therefore, to maintain Macao's stability after the
transition, China must handle the transition in the same manner it
handled the Hong Kong transition.
III. THE JOINT DECLARATION AND MACAO BASIC LAW

To understand the process of Macao's return, two important
legal documents must be examined: the Sino-Portugal Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law. These two documents share key
provisions. First, pursuant to the principle of "one country, two
systems," both documents state that the Central Government of
China will assume sovereignty over Macao and establish the
MSAR on December 20, 1999, in accordance with the provisions
of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China. 37 Second, both documents define the basic political

34. See generally Rone Tempest, Macao Hand-over Complicated by Deadly Turf War,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1999, at A5 (discussing the Chinese triads' influence in Macao). See
also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACrBOOK 1999, available at (visited
Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications> (noting that Macao "depends on
China for most of its food, fresh water, and energy imports."); Barbara Basler, Tiny Piece
of Empire, Cringing in Giant Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1989, at A4 (characterizing
Macao's economy as one that is dominated by Chinese investment companies). Cf.
Christine Courtney & David Holley, As '97 Nears, China Invests in Hong Kong, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at D1 (discussing China's extensive investments in Hong Kong).
35. See Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, Macau in Transition Section.
36. See, e.g., id. International Agreements Rights and Status Protected Section
(noting that the Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group agreed on the continued application
of many international agreements after the 1999 hand over-Macao's participation in such
agreements evidences that the international community views Macao as separate legal
entity from the People's Republic of China for purposes of applying international law).
37. See Joint Declaration para. 2(1), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 29; Basic Law of Macao preamble, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9,
1993, supra note 3, at I. Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
provides: "The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The
systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law
enacted by the National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions." P.R.C.
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181

structure determining Macao's future, including the relationship
between the Central Government and the MSAR and the
and legislative
procedures for electing the region's chief executive
38
rights.
human
basic
providing
and
representatives
The difference between the two documents is that each
governs a separate aspect of the transition process. The provisions
of the Joint Declaration serve as a general guide for the transition.
Under the Joint Declaration, a Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison
Group will be formed to facilitate the information exchange
between China and Portugal during the transition's planning
stages. 39 The Macao Basic Law codifies the Joint Declaration's
40
key provisions in a more detailed and comprehensive fashion.
The Macao Basic Law, which becomes effective on December 20,
1999, will serve as the "mini-constitution" of Macao. 4 1 The
Chinese National People's Congress promulgated the Macao Basic
Law,4 2 and the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (Standing Committee) has exclusive authority over the
Basic Law's final interpretation. 43 In other words, contrary to the
Joint Declaration, the Chinese are not legally obligated to consult
with the Portuguese as to whether the Chinese interpretation of
the Basic Law is consistent with the Joint Declaration. Although
the Joint Declaration defines the Macao Basic Law's framework,

CONST. art. 31 (1982).
38. See Joint Declaration Annex I, reprintedin CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 31; Basic Law of Macao chs. Il-III, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at II-IV.
39. See Joint Declaration para. 4, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 30. See also id. Annex II, § I, para. 1, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL
PAPERS, supra note 11, at 36.
40. For example, the Joint Declaration simply states the MSAR is subject to the
authority of the Central Government of China. See Joint Declaration para. 2(2), reprinted
in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note 11, at 29. The Macao Basic Law further
defines the relationship between the MSAR and the Central Government and stipulates
that the Central Government has the authority to determine, among other things, whether
any existing Macao laws conflict with the Macao Basic Law, the scope of the Central
Government's defense obligations, and the extent of the MSAR's responsibility to
maintain public order. See Basic Law of Macao ch. II, arts. 14, 17, 19, reprinted in BEIJING
REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II-III.
41. Cf. infra note 241 (discussing the notion of a "mini-constitution" as applied to
Hong Kong).
42. See Basic Law of Macao preamble, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at I.
43. See id. ch. VIII, art. 143, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9,1993, supra note 3,
at XIII.
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its influence will disappear when the law takes effect. Because the
major provisions of the two documents are substantively similar,
this discussion focuses on seven key provisions of the Macao Basic
Law.
(1) Under the principle of "one country, two systems," the
Macao Basic Law declares that China will resume its sovereignty
over Macao on December 20, 1999 and establish the MSAR
according to Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution. 44 Unlike
China's provincial governments, the MSAR will have a high
degree of autonomy and will be subject to the Central
Government's direct authority. 45 Potential issues arising under
this provision include a conflict of laws and a possible power
struggle between the Chinese Central Government and the Macao
46
Government.
(2) The MSAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy and
have executive, legislative, and independent judicial power,
including that of final adjudication. 47 The MSAR will not practice
the socialist system and the current system will remain unchanged
for fifty years. 48 This provision raises two issues. First, if Macao
has a high degree of autonomy, will it be subject to intervention by
the Central Government? If so, to what extent? Second, if the
final interpretation of the Macao Basic Law rests with the
Standing Committee, are Macao courts authorized to adjudicate
cases concerning state actions that are inconsistent with the Basic
Law?

49

(3) Chinese will be the official language. 50 Portuguese may be
51
used as an alternate official language.
(4) The Central Government will be responsible for Macao's
foreign affairs and defense. 52 It is the MSAR's obligation to

44. See id. preamble, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at I.
45. See Joint Declaration para. 2(2), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 29.

46. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see infra Part V.
47.

See Joint Declaration para. 2(2), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,

supra note 11, at 29.
48.

See Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 5, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,

supra note 3, at I.
49. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see infra Part V.
50. See Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 9, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,

supra note 3, at II.
51.
52.

See id.
See Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, Political Transition Section.
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maintain public order and conduct its internal affairs without
outside interference. 53 Here, the issue is whether China has the
right to deploy troops in Macao after the hand over. The Joint
Declaration is silent on this point. Ultimately, the answer will
depend on interpretation of these provisions.
(5) The MSAR will enact its own laws, and keep or repeal its
current laws as necessary. 54 Chinese national law will not apply to
the MSAR except in a state of emergency. 55 The Standing
Committee may invalidate all laws the MSAR legislature enacts
regarding the relationship between the MSAR and the Central
Government if these laws contradict the Macao Basic Law.56 The
Basic Law requires that the MSAR enact laws prohibiting any act
of treason, secession, sedition or subversion against the Central
Government, including theft of state secrets. 57 These provisions
are quite ambiguous and are replete with potential for abusive
interpretation in terms of human rights issues. The Standing
Committee has the exclusive and final authority in interpreting the
Macao Basic Law. 58 It also has the final word as to what
constitutes "a state of emergency" for purposes of determining
whether Chinese national law should apply to Macao. 59 The
interpretative flexibility of these provisions poses dangers. For
example, if Macao students and civilians stage a TiananmenSquare-type demonstration, will this be a state of emergency
warranting the Central Government to declare martial law in
Macao? In response to western media's criticisms of the Chinese
60
Government for jailing journalists who disclosed state secrets,
will the Macao Government similarly restrain reporters' freedom
to report politically sensitive news?

53. See Basic Law of Macao ch. II, arts. 13-14, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9,
1993, supra note 3, at II.
54. See id. ch. II, arts. 17, 23, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
at II.
55. See id. ch. II, art. 18, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II.
56. See id. ch. II, art. 17, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II;
see also id. ch. VIII, art. 143, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at

XIII.
57.
III.
58.
at XIII.
59.
60.

See id. ch. II, art. 23, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at
See id. ch. VIII, art. 143, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
See id. ch. II, art. 18, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II.
See Amnesty Highlights Reporters Jailed in China, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

(Paris), May 1, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Afg File.
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(6) Chapter IV of the Macao Basic Law describes the
MSAR's political structure. 61
An elected chief executive
accountable to the MSAR and the Central Government will
govern the MSAR. 62 The Legislative Council will enact the laws
of the MSAR. 63 An independent judiciary will be responsible for
adjudicating and interpreting the law, but will be limited to
adjudicating only those cases that do not involve foreign or
defense affairs. 64 The extent of the judiciary's power and
authority of final adjudication, as well as the localization of law
and civil service, are discussed below in more detail.
(7) Articles 25 through 44 represent the MSAR's "Bill of
Rights." The Articles protect Macao residents' freedom of speech,
religion, and association, right of privacy, freedom from any
discrimination, and presumption of innocence. 65 Article 40
provides that "The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Macao
residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such
restrictions shall not contravene the provisions of the first
paragraph of this Article." 66 Because the Chinese and English
languages may interpret certain concepts differently, a potential
67
problem arises concerning the definition of these guarantees.
An overview of the relevant provisions of the Macao Basic
Law demonstrates that potential issues may arise between China,
Portugal, the Central Government, and the MSAR. For example,
because of cultural divergence and the differences between the
Mainland China and MSAR legal systems,68 China's past
61. See generally Basic Law of Macao ch. IV, arts. 45-102, reprintedin BEIJING REV.,
May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at VIX.
62. See id. ch. IV, arts. 45, 47, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
at V.
63. See id. ch. IV, arts. 67, 71(1), reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra
note 3, at VII.
64. See id. ch. ViII, art. 143, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
at XIII; id. ch. IV, art. 82, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at VIII.
65. See generally id. ch. III, arts. 24-44, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at III-IV.
66. Id. ch. III, art. 40, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at IV.
The first paragraph of Article 40 states, "The provisions of International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Macao shall remain in force and
shall be implemented through the laws of the Macao Special Administrative Region." Id.
67. See Frances H. Foster, The Illusory Promise: Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong,
China, 73 IND. L.J. 765,773-775 (1998).
68. See Jin Huang & Andrew Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law
Familiesand FourLegal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Law in China,
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experience in operating the Special Economic Zones offers little
practical guidance. 69 Additionally, because Macao is part of
China, the principle of international conflict of law may not
apply.70 The recent Hong Kong hand over experience may
provide some positive perspectives for Macao, but it is too early to
draw any meaningful conclusions as to how well the "one country,
two systems" works. There are no clear answers to these issues at
this stage. For China and Macao, learning will occur through trial
and error.
IV. CURRENT ISSUES AND DISPUTES

The Hong Kong hand over was a difficult event for both the
Chinese and British Governments. 71 In comparison, the Chinese
and Portuguese Governments anticipate that Macao's transition
will be friendly. 72 When Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji met
Portugal's Prime Minister Antonio Guterres on April 21, 1998, he
promised that China would strictly abide by the Joint Declaration
73
and resolve all related issues "in a spirit of cooperation."
Several disputes, however, have escalated to a point where
each nation blames the other for acting in bad faith. The Chinese
Government is concerned with three major issues: (1) localizing
civil servants; (2) localizing laws; and (3) establishing the official
status of the Chinese language. 74 Recently, issues such as
controlling gang violence, deploying troops, and appropriating the
fiscal reserve have also received attention. 75 Because these
disputes relate to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of
the Joint Declaration, this Article discusses them in that context.

5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 300 (1995). For a discussion of the Special Economic
Zones, see infra Part V.
69. See Special Economic Zone and the Open Coastal Belt (visited Oct. 27, 1999)
<http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/news/AboutChina.html>
[hereinafter
Special
Economic Zone].
70. See Huang & Qian, supra note 68, at 310-311.
71. See Macao Plans Easy Transitionfrom Portugal to China, supra note 35, at 25.
See also Davis, supra note 8, at 304.
72. See Joint Declaration Annex II, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 36.
73. Cooperation Vowed on Macao Handover, supra note 5, at 5.
74. See Committee Preparesfor Macao's Return, supra note 1, at 5.
75. See generally Macau, China Agree on More Cooperation to Beat Triads, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), Oct. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
See also China Calls for Macau Civil Service to be Localized Soon, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE (Paris), Nov. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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A. Localizing Civil Servants
Paragraph 2(3) and Annex I, section I, of the Joint
Declaration state that the Macao Government will be composed of
"local inhabitants." 76 Although ethnic Chinese make up ninetyfive percent of the Macao population, only seven out of fifty senior
civil servants in Macao are of Chinese decent. 77 Traditionally, the
Portuguese occupied most of these positions. 78 The Portuguese,
79
however, will presumably leave Macao after December 20, 1999.
In order to successfully transfer Macao to China, it is critical,
therefore, that public services are localized before the hand over.
The localization process, unfortunately, is very slow. The
Portuguese Government runs Macao like a colony; Portuguese
expatriates hold the top seven civil service jobs. 80 The fact that
Macao is considered a place for Portuguese ex-officers to "get rich
quick," 81 probably causes the Chinese to doubt whether the exofficers will leave. Before 1984, the civil service positions the
Chinese held were either those of ordinary workers or junior
policemen 82 -the
Portuguese controlled all major senior
management positions. 83 The Chinese worry that the Portuguese
may create a "Mozambique syndrome,"84 in that the Portuguese
officers may maintain their well-paying jobs until the hand over
and then leave the whole city to the unqualified Macao Chinese
85
who are unable to supervise the new MSAR's functioning.

76. Joint Declaration para. 2(3), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 29; id. Annex I, § III, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note
11, at 31.
77. See John Gittings, Macau Countdown Begins with Killing, GUARDIAN (London),
Dec. 21,1998, at 11, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
78. See generally China Callsfor Macau Civil Service to be Localized Soon, supra note
75 (noting that "Beijing has called for the speedy transfer of senior civil service positions
to the local Chinese in the Portuguese enclave of Macau...").
79. See Joint Declaration para. 1, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 29.
80. See Todd Crowell & Law Siu-Lan, Troubled Transition, ASIAWEEK (Causeway
Bay, H.K.), Apr. 24, 1998, at 24, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
81. Gittings, supra note 77, at 11.
82. See Lau, supra note 24, at 17.
83. See id.
84. Crowell & Siu-Lan, supra note 80, at 24 (explaining that the term, "Mozambique
Syndrome," refers to "civil servants clinging to their well-paid jobs to the last moment
then tossing the administration over to the unqualified locals.").
85. See id.
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In comparison, the British localized the Hong Kong
Government, except for the attorney general and the governor,
long before the Hong Kong hand over. 86 This early localization
contributed to the success of Hong Kong's transition. 87 The
Portuguese Government promises to localize Macao civil services
before the hand over, 88 but this promise has yet to be realized.
B. Localizing Laws
In addition to localizing civil servants, the Chinese
Government is also concerned about localizing laws, which is a
vague concept that is not clearly defined in the Joint Declaration. 89
Localizing laws in Macao involves three potential problems: all
Macao legal documents are in Portuguese; few Chinese nationals
qualify for the judiciary; and Macao's current laws may contradict
the Joint Declaration or Basic Law.
These issues are internally related to each other. Annex I,
section IV of the Joint Declaration requires that Macao establish a
final court of appeal. 90 For several reasons, few Chinese nationals
qualify for positions on the bench. First, Portuguese continues to
be the official legal language of Macao-all Macao's legal
documents are written in Portuguese. 91 Therefore, a Macao judge
must understand both Chinese and Portuguese to properly
adjudicate cases. After December 20, 1999, however, Chinese will
be the official language. 92 Second, few Chinese nationals have
served in the Macao judiciary under Portuguese rule and
therefore, do not have both the necessary legal experience and
bilingual capabilities to serve on the bench. 93 After the hand over,
the primary undertakings for the Chinese Government will be to
86. See Tale of Two Cities, ASIAWEEK (Causeway Bay, H.K.), Apr. 24, 1998, at 25,
availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File (noting that "all top positions [in the civil
service were] filled by ethnic Chinese, except for governor and attorney general.").
87. See id.
88. See Chinese Official Urges Quicker Localization in Macao, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (New York, N.Y.), Oct. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws
File.
89. See Chinese Official Urges Quicker Localization in Macao, supra note 88.
90. See Joint Declaration Annex I, § IV, reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 32.
91. See Chinese Official Urges Quicker Localization in Macao, supra note 88.
92. See Joint Declaration para. 2(5), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 30 (providing that in addition to the Chinese language, Portuguese may
also be used in "organs of government.").
93. See Crowell & Siu-Lan, supra note 80, at 24.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 22:175

train and appoint qualified Chinese nationals to the judiciary and
translate the law into Chinese. Compared to the Portuguese, the
British did a superior job in appointing ethnic Chinese to the Hong
94
Kong bench.
The third aspect of localizing laws is keeping Macao's current
law in force unless it contradicts the Joint Declaration or the
Macao Basic Law. 95 The MSAR may make its own law, amend, or
repeal the current law, 96 but it must report any such activity to the
Standing Committee for the record. 97 A problem may arise as to
whether a Macao law should be kept, amended, or repealed. For
example, China utilizes the death penalty; 98 Macao has banned
capital punishment since the mid-19th century. 99 Chinese officials
indicate that the Chinese Government will respect Macao's
judicial heritage.100 Because China and Macao have different
political ideologies and legal traditions, however, the Standing
Committee, which possesses authority to invalidate Macao laws it
deems unfit, 10 1 will thus inevitably clash with the authority of
Macao's legislature.
C. Chinese as the Official Language
Paragraph 2(5) of the Joint Declaration states that
Portuguese, in addition to Chinese, may be used by the MSAR
Government. 10 2 The Chinese Government wants to ensure that
10 3
Chinese will be the official language after the Macao transition.
The Portuguese Government fears that Portuguese may lose its

94. See id.
95. See Joint Declaration Annex I, § III, reprintedin CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 31.
96. See id. See also Basic Law of Macao ch. IV, art. 71(1), reprinted in BEIJING REV.,
May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at VII.
97. See Joint Declaration Annex I, § III, reprintedin CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 31-32.

98. See generally Macau Death Penalty Ban "to Stay," H.K. STANDARD (Kowloon
Bay, Kowloon), Feb. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.

99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Basic Law of Macao ch. 1, art. 17, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supranote 3, at II.
102. See Joint Declaration para. 2(5), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supranote 11, at 30.
103. See Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 9, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at II.
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language status after December 20, 1999,104 because ninety-five
percent of Macao's population is Chinese 10 5 and Chinese is the
primary language spoken. Because the Chinese Government's
view will likely prevail in the Macao legislation, the Chinese
Government may leave this decision to future Macao
governments. 10 6 Although the Macao Basic Law, like the Joint
Declaration, states that Portuguese may be an additional official
language, 10 7 it is optional. Despite the fact that the Portuguese
influence will be a dominant one at the time of the transition, it is
foreseeable that this influence may slowly fade away in time.
D. Social Order and Security
Paragraph 2(10) of the Joint Declaration states that the
Macao Government is responsible for maintaining public order in
Macao. 10 8 In the past two years, public security in Macao
deteriorated dramatically because of gang violence.1 0 9 Because
110
Macao's economy largely depends on casino-related tourism,
the gangs, known in Macao as "triads," fight each other to gain
control of the casino operations.1 1 1 The triads retaliate against
Macao police and public officials for attempting to regulate and
investigate the triads' role in illegal casino operations. 112 The
triads have bombed, kidnapped, and shot governmental officials
and innocent people in casinos and on the streets.1 1 3 As a result of
this ongoing violence, the Macao tourism economy has declined. 114

104. See generally id.
105. See Tempest, supra note 34, at A5.
106. See China Blasts Portugalover Macau's Handover,supra note 9.
107. See Joint Declaration para. 2(5), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 30; Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 9, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9,
1993, supra note 3, at II.
108. See Joint Declaration para. 2(10), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 30.
109. See generally Gittings, supra note 77, at 11. See also generally Mark Landler,
Macao Astir over Troops in Handoverto Beijing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, at 4 (noting
that "Macao's residents are exhausted by [the] gang war . . . [and] are very concerned

about security." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. See generally Macau Government Homepage, supra note 12, Unique Appeal of

Macau Section (explaining that "[a]lmost half of Macau's visitors come for leisure and to
gamble.").
111. See generally John Ridding, Macau Prepares to Crack Down on Triads, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 1997, at 3, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Fintime File.
112. See generally Gittings, supra note 77, at 11.
113. See id.
114. See Harold Bruning, Macao's Triad Tentacles Scare off Potential Investors, FIN.
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The Macao Government's ability to maintain public order,
particularly its ability to provide security to Chinese leaders on the
day of the transition ceremony, is questionable. 1 15 Many speculate
whether Mainland China is the source of the violence and hope
that the Chinese Government will cooperate.
The Chinese
Government, on the other hand, criticized the Macao
Government's inability to control and aggressively reduce the
violence. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government agreed to deploy
troops around Macao to assist the Macao police in controlling the
spread of violence. 1 16 Cooperation between the two sides has
been successful thus far.1 17 The implications of triad violence,
however, extend far beyond public security issues. The Portuguese
Government's inability to effectively control the violence
disappointed Macao residents, who are now eager to see the
Chinese Government take over Macao. 118 The triad violence not
only created a foundation of public support for the Chinese
takeover, but also provided the Chinese Government with an
excuse to deploy troops in Macao thereafter.
E. Deploying Troops
Although the triad violence gives the Chinese Government a
reason to deploy troops in Macao, the Joint Declaration does not
clearly address whether the Chinese Government may do so after
the hand over. The Joint Declaration merely states that the
Central Government is responsible for Macao's defense and that
the Macao Government must maintain the public order. 119 Early
in the transition, both the Chinese and the Portuguese agreed it
was not necessary to station troops in Macao. 120 In 1975, the

POST (Toronto), May 16, 1997, at 57, available in LEXIS, World Library, Natpst File
(noting that "some hotels have complained of a fall in business.").
115. See generally id. (discussing recent killings and attempted assassinations in Macao

by Chinese contract killers).
116.

See Macao, China Agree on More Cooperation to Beat Triads, supra note 75.

Although Macao Government officials believe the overall crime rate dropped, they admit
that incidences of arson, kidnapping, and other serious offenses increased. See Gittings,
supra note 77, at 11.
117. See generally Macao, China Agree on More Cooperation to Beat Triads, supra

note 75.
118. See id.
119. See Joint Declaration para. 2(10), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 30.
120. See Portugalto Hold Talks with China on Stationing in Macau, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE (Paris), Sept. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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Portuguese Government pulled out the troops it deployed in
Macao. 121 Lu Ping, Director of China's Hong Kong and Macao
Affairs Office, stated that Macao was too small to warrant a
122
garrison.
The Chinese Government later changed its position, however,
and decided to deploy troops in Macao because the triad violence
was out of control. 123 The Portuguese Government immediately
criticized China for deviating from the spirit of the Joint
Declaration 124 and for placing a "new interpretation" on the terms
of the hand over. 125 In response, the Chinese Government
defended its decision by stating
that it evinced China's re126
commencement of sovereignty.
Portugal acted similarly when it deployed and stationed
troops in Macao upon its takeover. 127
The Portuguese
Government withdrew its troops during the Portuguese
Revolution because it decided to renounce its overseas
colonies128 -it did not remove the troops because Macao no
longer required their presence. 129 Therefore, the Portuguese
Government's argument, that the Chinese Government should not
station troops in Macao for defense purposes, is a weak one.
Although the Chinese may prevail in stationing troops despite
Portuguese protest, China may lose its credibility in the
international community because the Chinese Government clearly
stated that it would strictly abide by130the Joint Declaration and give
Macao a high degree of autonomy.
F. Other Issues
Two other issues souring the Sino-Portuguese relationship,
include the depletion of Macao's fiscal reserves and the protected

121. See id.
122. See China Has No Plans to Station PLA in Macau, REUTER WORLD SERVICE,
Apr. 27, 1997.
123. See Portugalto Hold Talks with China on Stationing Troops in Macau, supra note
120.
124. See id.
125. See Landler, supra note 109, at 4.
126. See China to Send Troops to Macau After Next Year's Handover, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), Sept. 18, 1998, availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
127. See Landler, supra note 109, at 4.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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status of Macao residents holding Portuguese passports. In the
131
past, the Macao Government accumulated fiscal reserves.
Recently, however, the Government decided to incorporate all the
accumulated past savings into the 1999 budget.132 This move may
have raised suspicions that Portuguese officials were intentionally
depleting the reserves before leaving Macao.
The Chinese
Government argued that the savings should be turned over to the
new MSAR Government after December 20, 1999, because it
133
belongs to the people of Macao.
The Chinese Government is also upset with the Portuguese
Government's excessive issuance of Portuguese passports to
Macao residents. 134 The Portuguese issued Macao residents far
more passports, permitting migration to any European Union
country, than the British issued in Hong Kong. 135 Because China
does not recognize dual citizenship, Macao residents may only use
their Portuguese passports as "travel documents,"'136 and not to
invoke consular protection, despite the fact that the Portuguese
Government maintains that the Macao people "can opt to retain
their Portuguese nationality, which grants them consular
protection. "137
The above disputes demonstrate that the Macao transition is
not running smoothly and that the Sino-Portuguese relationship is
not as friendly as the two countries claim. It is certainly better,
however, than the Sino-British relationship during the Hong Kong
hand over. 138 In contrast to British Governor Chris Patton, who
strongly defended British interests in Hong Kong and the future of
Hong Kong democracy, the Portuguese Governor is not concerned
about Macao's future with respect to issues such as localizing civil
services and deploying troops. 139 What Portuguese officials truly
care about, however, is using their last days in Macao to make as

131. See generally China Attacks Portugal over Macau Budget Ahead of Handover,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), Dec. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allnws File.
132.
133.

See id.
See id.

134. See China, Portugalat Odds over Passportsin Macau, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 23, 1997.
135. See Crowell & Siu-Lan, supra note 80, at 24.
136. China, Portugalat Odds over Passportsin Macau, supra note 134.
137.

Id.

138. See Davis, supra note 8, at 304.
139. See generally id.
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much money as possible. 140 The Chinese Government may
therefore triumph on most of the issues, especially given its refusal
to grant consular protection to Macao residents holding
Portuguese passports. Because Portuguese officials are primarily
concerned with monetary issues, the Sino-Portuguese problems
will likely be resolved in China's favor. This imbalance increases
human rights groups' concerns about whether China will keep its
pledge under the Basic Law to give Macao autonomy and judicial
141
independence and guarantee human rights to Macao's people.
V. INTERPRETING THE BASIC LAW: AUTONOMY, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AND

HUMAN RIGHTS

Macao's future stability and prosperity largely depend on how
the Macao Basic Law is implemented. The fundamental principle
underlying the Basic Law is the theory of "one country, two
systems." 142 Under this theory, the Chinese will establish a Special
Administrative Region in Macao similar to the Hong Kong
model. 143 China has experimented with the "one country, two
144
systems" theory in the southeast coastal cities for over a decade.
These cities, designated as the Special Economic Zones, enjoy a
high degree of autonomy, including the right to practice free
market economies. 145
The experiment, which is thus far
successful, demonstrates that China can maintain co-existing
146
socialist and market systems.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was
established using the same philosophy as was employed to
establish the Special Economic Zones.
There is a major
difference, however, between the Special Economic Zones and the
Special Administrative Region. The Special Economic Zones
practice free market systems and have decentralized policy-making

140. See generally Crowell & Siu-Lan, supra note 80, at 24.
141. See generally Amnesty International Urges Macau Leaders to Ensure Human
Rights, supra note 10.
142. See generally Guigio Wang & Priscilla M.F. Leung, One Country, Two Systems:
Theory Into Practice,7 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J.279 (1998) (discussing the "one country,
two systems" theory as applied to Hong Kong, not to Macao).
143. See Joint Declaration para. 2(1), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,
supra note 11, at 29.
144. See Special Economic Zone, supra note 69 (explaining China's five Special
Economic Zones and their favorable trade and investment policies).
145. See id.
146. See id.
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systems.147 The Special Administrative Region, in contrast, will
have a very different legal and political system. Macao and Hong
Kong are experimenting with a new version of the "one country,
two systems" theory. 148 The Special Economic Zones are subject
to the direct control of China, and the Chinese Government is free
to make, repeal, or amend any applicable law without arousing the
The international
international community's interest. 149
community, however, maintains an interest in the stability and
prosperity of Macao and Hong Kong because of their respective
histories. 150 Therefore, any wisdom gained from the Special
Economic Zones experience may not help Macao. Naturally,
questions arise as to whether the two legal systems, socialist China
and capitalist Macao, will conflict in the future. Resolution of any
potential conflict is determinable only upon interpretation of the
Basic Law.
Macao is a Chinese territory and is therefore subject to the
Central Government's will. 151 China need not utilize international
conflict of law principles to resolve future disputes with Macao.
The Standing Committee, not an independent judiciary, has the
exclusive authority regarding the final interpretation of the Macao
Basic Law. 152 Although the Macao Basic Law is virtually a mirror
image of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 153 the limited Hong Kong
experience will not serve as a useful guide in executing the Macao
hand over.
To a certain extent, however, Hong Kong's experiences may
help predict Macao's fate. For example, a recent controversy
between Hong Kong and China concerning an immigration law
decision the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal rendered 154 reveals
that a similar conflict may arise between a Macao court and the
Central Government. The following discussion covers three

147.

See generally id.

148. See Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 290.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 289-290.
151.

See Joint Declaration para. 2(2), reprinted in CHANG, OCCASIONAL PAPERS,

supra note 11, at 29.
152. See Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 301.
153.
154.

See Lau, supra note 24, at 17.
See Mark Landler, Hong Kong Ruling on Children May Open a Door from China,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at 5 (referring to Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, 38
I.L.M. 551, May 1999 (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Final Appeal,
Jan. 29, 1999)).
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critical conflicts of law issues likely to arise from implementation
of the Basic Law: autonomy, judicial independence, and human
rights.
A. Autonomy
Article 2 of the Macao Basic Law states that "[t]he National
People's Congress authorizes the Macao Special Administrative
Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive,
legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final
155
adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law."
Article 5 guarantees that the "previous capitalist
system and way
156
of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years."
The troubling language in Article 2 is its use of the phrase, "a
high degree of autonomy," 157 which, although could easily be
interpreted as equivalent to independence, has never been
interpreted as such. One of the reasons the Chinese Government
granted the MSAR such a high degree of autonomy was to
maintain Macao's current economic and political systems for fifty
years after the hand over. 158 The purpose of having two systems is
to unite China; one country, not independence, is the ultimate
objective. 159 The MSAR may enjoy the privilege of autonomy in
its independent policy decision-making, but because autonomy is a
matter of degree, the privilege is relative to the ordinary autonomy
other provincial or autonomous governments posses. Therefore,
the MSAR's autonomy is subject to Central Government
intervention, if necessary.1 60 Bearing this in mind, it is clear that
Macao's "high degree of autonomy" is actually subject to greater
limitations than the Basic Law's drafter's envisioned.
Although the Basic Law gives the future Macao legislature
power to promulgate necessary laws, 161 this grant of legislative

155. Basic Law of Macao ch. 1, art. 2, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra
note 3, at I.
156. Id. art. 5, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at I.
157. Id. art. 2, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at I.
158. Cf.Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 289 (discussing, for example, the Chinese
Government's grant of autonomy to Hong Kong and preservation of Hong Kong's
economic structure). According to the Basic Law of Macao, the country's current
"capitalist system and the way of life shall remain unchanged for [fifty] years." Basic Law
of Macao ch. I, art. 5, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at I.
159. See generally Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 283-285.
160. See id. at 286.
161. See Basic Law of Macao ch. I, art. 11, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
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autonomy is limited. The MSAR must submit all laws it enacts to
the Standing Committee for the Committee's approval.16 2 If the
Standing Committee finds that a law does not conform to the
Macao Basic Law, it will return the law to the MSAR to be
invalidated. 1 63 Because the Standing Committee has authority to
make the final interpretations of the Basic Law, 164 it has the
16 5
exclusive discretion to return any Macao law in question.
Article 18 of the Macao Basic Law may further curtail
Pursuant to Article 18, the
Macao's legislative autonomy.
Standing Committee may add or delete national laws listed in
Annex III of the Macao Basic Law. 1 66 Although the applicable
national laws represent a very narrow category of laws (e.g., laws
governing the national flag and national day), there are no
provisions preventing the Standing Committee from expanding
Article 18's application into other areas. The Central Government
may also order that the relevant national law apply to the MSAR
during a state of emergency; 16 7 the Standing Committee decides
what constitutes a state of emergency. Clearly, the Macao Basic
Law provides the Central Government with a great degree of
flexibility in allowing it to interpret the law to serve its policy
limit Macao
purposes. The Central Government may further
168
autonomy by amending the Basic Law, if necessary.
B. JudicialIndependence
The MSAR's judicial system will consist of primary courts,
169
intermediate courts, and the Court of Final Appeal.
Additionally, administrative courts will oversee administrative and
taxation procedures. 170 The Macao courts will have jurisdiction

supra note 3, at II.
162. See id. ch.
163. See id.
164. See id. ch.
at XIII.
165. See id. ch.
166. See id. ch.
167. See id.
168. See id. ch.
at XIII.
169. See id. ch.

II, art. 17, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II.
VIll, art. 143, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
II, art. 17, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II.
II, art. 18, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at II.
VIII, art. 144, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
IV, art. 84, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at

VIII.
170. See id. ch. IV, arts. 86, 88, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
at VIII.
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over all cases except those related to national defense and foreign
affairs. 171 "The courts of the Macao Special Administrative
Region shall exercise judicialpower independently. They shall be.
. nothing but law ....-172 The Court of Final Appeal will be the
that the
court of last resort. 173 A careful analysis, however, reveals
174
MSAR judiciary's independence is somewhat limited.
The Court of Final Appeal's adjudication is subject to three
primary restraints. 175 First, where a case concerns questions of
certain state actions, including defense or foreign affairs, the Court
must obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive, who, in turn,
must obtain a certifying document from the Central
Government. 176 Second, the Court may only interpret the Macao
Basic Law for purposes of adjudicating cases, and its interpretation
is subject to the authority of the Standing Committee's
interpretation. 177 In other words, if the Court's interpretation has
broad policy implications extending beyond the case itself, the
Standing Committee may intervene if it finds the decision affects
the Central Government's policy. This is precisely what happened
in Ng Ka Ling v. Directorof Immigration, as discussed below.
Lastly, the Court must suspend its judgement in cases
concerning interpretation of the relationship between the Central
Government and the MSAR if such decisions would have an
unappealable effect. 178 The Court of Final Appeal must obtain an
interpretation from the Standing Committee before rendering such
decisions. 179 The Macao Basic Law, however, does not elaborate
such a standard for the Court to follow. 180 Can the Court correctly
identify such issues and seek timely interpretation from the
Standing Committee? Can the Court decide cases within the limits

171. See id. ch. II, art. 19, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at
III.
172. Id. ch. IV, art. 83, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at VIII
(emphasis added).
173. See id. ch. IV, art. 84, reprintedin BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,at
VIII.
174. See Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 305.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 176-179.
176. See Basic Law of Macao ch. II, art. 19, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at III.
177. See id. ch. VIII, art. 143, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3,
at XIII.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Hong Kong Court 'Clarifies' Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 1999, at A12.
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of Macao autonomy that directly or indirectly affect Central
Government policies? The Hong Kong Ng Ka Ling case sheds
light on future potential limitations on the Macao judiciary's
181
autonomy and independence.
The Hong Kong Basic Law contains a provision giving Hong
Kong courts independent judicial power, including the power of
final adjudication.1 82 This independence was recently tested on
January 29, 1999, when the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, in a
landmark decision, overturned a lower court ruling and allowed
four Mainland-born children to stay in Hong Kong. 183 Because
the Chinese Government worries that people will flood into Hong
Kong if it does not maintain tight border control, all immigration
into Hong Kong must be government approved. 184 After the hand
over, the Hong Kong legislature tightened immigration laws
accordingly. 185
The Ng Ka Ling plaintiffs challenged the
legitimacy of the new immigration laws under the Hong Kong
Basic Law. 186 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, following
local laws, ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. 187 The ruling's broad
policy implications extend beyond the case's main issues-it
allowed children born to Hong Kong parents who live in China to
directly apply to the Hong Kong Court for permission to
migrate. 188 In other words, these immigrants no longer needed the
Chinese Government's approval.
The immediate consequence of the decision, which
encouraged immigrants to circumvent the Chinese immigration
policy, put the Hong Kong judiciary directly in conflict with the
Chinese Central Government. 189 If the ruling was not overturned,
thousands of Chinese may have tried to enter Hong Kong.
Chinese legal scholars criticized the ruling for giving more weight

181. See Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, 38 I.L.M. 551, May 1999 (Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Court of Final Appeal, Jan. 29, 1999).
182. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China art. 19, Apr. 4, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1520, 1523 (1990)
[hereinafter Basic Law of Hong Kong].
183. See Ng Ka Ling, 38 I.L.M. at 552.
184. See id. at 553.
185. See Landler, supra note 154, at 5.
186. See Ng Ka Ling, 38 I.L.M. at 559-560.
187. See id. at 577-57&
188. See Landler, supra note 154, at 5.
189. See Mark Landler, China Tells Hong Kong It Wants Immigration Ruling
'Rectified,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at 13.
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to the Hong Kong Court's interests than to the policy of the
National People's Congress, and argued that the ruling "should be
rectified." 190 Zhao Qizheng, Head of the Information Office of
China's State Council, commented that the decision was a
"'mistake' and 'should be changed."' 191 Although the Hong Kong
Basic Law requires the Chinese Government approve all
immigrants to Hong Kong,192 the ambiguity of the language does
not necessarily deprive the Hong Kong Court of jurisdiction over
immigration cases. 193 The real question was whether the Central
Government's interpretation of this provision controls, or whether
control lies with the Hong Kong Court.
According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Hong Kong
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, and its interpretation
of the Hong Kong Basic Law should prevail if a case has no
bearing on defense, foreign affairs, or the relationship between the
Central Government and the Hong Kong region. 194 Under high
pressure from the Chinese Government and in light of the danger
of jeopardizing the relationship between the Standing Committee
and Hong Kong, the High Court of Hong Kong, on February 26,
1999, issued a clarification, 195 which stated that the Court did not
intend to question the Standing Committee's authority. 196 The
High Court avoided the more fundamental question of whether
the Court could challenge an act of the Central Government under
the Hong Kong Basic Law.197 This episode ended in the Standing
Committee's decision to overturn the Hong Kong High Court's

190. Id.
191. Mark Clifford, Will Beijing Keep Its Word?, BUS. WEEK (New York, N.Y.), Feb.
22, 1999, at 58.
192. See Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 22, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1520, supra note 182,
at 1524 ("For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other
parts of China must apply for approval.").
193. See id. art. 158, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1520, supra note 182, at 1545 (explaining
that the Hong Kong courts may interpret other provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law in
adjudicating cases; if in doing so, the need arises to interpret provisions of the Hong Kong
Basic Law concerning affairs that are the Central Government's specific responsibility,
then courts should seek interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing
Committee through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region).
194. See Basic Law of Hong Kong art. 19, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1520, supra note 182,
at 1523-1524.
195. See Hong Kong Court 'Clarifies' Ruling, supra note 180, at A12.
196. See id.
197. See id.
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ruling, reasoning that the Court's interpretation of the Hong Kong
1 98
Basic Law was erroneous.
This incident established a precedent for Central Government
intervention in the Special Administrative Region's judicial
independence, and marked the beginning of the conflict between
the two entities. In the absence of a neutral judiciary to interpret
the Hong Kong Basic Law, 19 9 clashes between the two are
inevitable because the competing authorities will interpret the law
differently. In Ng Ka Ling, the Hong Kong High Court was
concerned with legal standing principles, while the Standing
Committee
was concerned with
the ruling's
practical
consequences.2 0 0 It is foreseeable that similar clashes between
China and the Macao judiciary could occur because Macao also
faces potential Mainland Chinese migration.2 0 1 Accordingly, this
case sends a message to Macao courts that their judicial
independence may be limited.
This clash involves both a conflict between two different legal
systems and a conflict between two different legal traditions.
China is a civil law country.2 0 2 The Chinese courts have no
experience with interpreting the Constitution;2 0 3 in fact, they have
never so done. 20 4 The Standing Committee interprets the Chinese
Constitution only for decision-making purposes.2 05 Therefore, the
Committee has little experience in interpreting constitutional
20 6
provisions like the Macao Basic Law.

198. See Erik Guyot, Hong Kong's New Order is Expediency, WALL ST. J., July 2,
1999, at A10.
199. Although the Supreme People's Court is the highest court of the land, it does not
have the independent interpretative power equivalent to that of the United States
Supreme Court. See Foster, supra note 67, at 791-793.
200. See Guyot, supra note 198, at A10. If the Hong Kong High Court's ruling was not
overruled, it would have permitted about 1.67 million Mainland Chinese to immigrate to
Hong Kong. See id. This represents approximately one-quarter of the already existing
Hong Kong population. See Halloran, supra note 4, at 10. A Hong Kong Government
survey and strong public sentiment influenced the Standing Committee's decision to
overrule the High Court-implying that the Court's decision was not necessarily founded
on legal reasoning. See Guyot, supra note 198, at A10.
201. See Macau Plans Easy Transitionfrom Portugalto China, supra note 33, at 25.
202. See Wang & Leung, supra note 142, at 301.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 308.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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In contrast, courts often interpret constitutions during
adjudication in common law jurisdictions. 20 7 Apparently, the
Chinese are not ready to accept the possibility that the Macao
Basic Law can be challenged in lower courts. The Chinese must
learn from their experience, and from other countries'
experiences, and recognize and accept the possibility that lower
courts might challenge the Macao Basic Law.
C. Human Rights
From the international community's perspective, one of the
most sensitive issues involved in Macao's return concerns
Macanese human rights. Articles 24 through 45 of the Macao
Basic Law state that the MSAR respects and protects all aspects of
fundamental human rights, from religious freedoms to privacy
rights. 20 8 Although the plain language of the Articles enumerates
the protected rights, human rights watchers worry that Macao is
more vulnerable to human rights abuses than was Hong Kong
because Macao's society is not as strong as is Hong Kong's, which
embraces a democratic spirit.20 9 Because the Chinese human
rights tradition under communist rule does not conform to western
standards, the Chinese Government may interpret human rights
concepts, as defined in the Macao Basic Law, differently than
would a western society.
The Chinese translation of the notion of a "fundamental
right" or "freedom" is subtly different than the English
translation. 210 Because of different contexts and cultures, the
Chinese and westerners may understand and interpret the same
words differently. 211 For example, under traditional Chinese
teachings, the state's interest always outranks the individual's
interest. 212 The state's interest is not merely limited to state
security interest, but is a much broader interest, encompassing
everything concerning state authority. 213 This traditional Chinese

207. See id. at 309.
208. See generally Basic Law of Macao ch. III, arts. 21-45, reprinted in BEIJING REV.,
May 3-9, 1993, supra note 3, at III-IV.
209. See Amnesty International Urges Macau Leaders to Ensure Human Rights, supra

note 10.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See
See
See
See

Foster, supra note 67, at 773.
generally id.
Davis, supra note 8, at 318.
id.
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view will likely affect the interpretation of the Macao Basic Law's
human rights provisions.
Another example of these language differences is the
application of the phrase "freedom of the press," which is more
narrow in Chinese than in English. 214 "Freedom," or "ziyou," in
Chinese, traditionally carries some negative meaning suggesting
"[1]icense to [b]e [b]ad. ''215 "The press" means "publication" in
Chinese and does not include other means of expression or
communication such as the mass media.216 "Freedom of the
press," under the communist rule in China, is always a politically
sensitive concept.217 Any direct and harsh criticism of the Chinese
Government or its policies is unacceptable because it extends
beyond the "freedom of the press." 218 There is no tolerance in
China for freedom of expression if it challenges the authority of
the state. 219 In Macao, the term "freedom of the press" may have
a broader application due to Macao's century of western cultural
influences.
Furthermore, the Chinese human rights tradition is different
from the western tradition. 220 In balancing competing interests of
the state and the individual, the Chinese emphasize "sovereignty,
subsistence, and the preeminence of collective over individual
rights in the interest of economic development. '221 The most
rudimentary official teaching in Chinese schools emphasizes that
the "individual does not exist without the [s]tate." 222 This notion
is also reflected in Chapter III of the Macao Basic Law, which is
titled the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents." 223
The Macao Basic Law does not separate the fundamental rights of
a citizen from his or her duties or obligations, but emphasizes a
224
balance of rights and inalienable duties.

214. See Foster, supra note 67, at 773.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. See generally id.
218. See id. at 768.
219. See id.
220. See Davis, supra note 8, at 318.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Basic Law of Macao ch. III, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra note
3, at III.
224. See generally id. ch. II, arts. 24-45, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,
supra note 3, at III.
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Chapter III generally defines basic human rights and subjects
these rights to certain restrictions, such as the necessity of
maintaining social order.225 Article 23 requires that the Macao
legislature enact laws prohibiting any act of treason, secession,
sedition, subversion against the Central Government, or theft of
state secrets. 226 These abstract concepts may invite abusive
interpretations that serve specific political purposes. China jailed
political dissidents for charges similar to those Article 23
prohibits. 227 Will this also happen in Macao?
Macao, long under Portuguese influence, embraces the
western concepts of individual rights and personal freedom from
unreasonable governmental interference. It is foreseeable that
Macao courts and the Chinese Government will apply different
standards derived from their respective cultural traditions when
interpreting fundamental rights, and that the cultural clash may
lead to social discontent and instability. Neither side may know
where the boundary between providing fundamental rights and
maintaining social order lies.
Macao lacks strong grassroots democratic forces and an
appealing opposing political party to balance against the potential
Chinese abuse of human rights. 228 Unlike the British, the
Portuguese will not leave behind a Hong Kong-type, welldeveloped democratic political system in Macao. According to
Rory Mungoven, Director of Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific
Program, little international interest and a weak and fragile229civil
society make Macao very vulnerable to human rights abuses.
For example, not long ago, the Macao Government blocked
production of a play because its subject matter was too political,
230
despite its success in Hong Kong, Portugal, Britain, and Kenya.
225. See generally id. ch. II, art. 23, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993, supra

note 3, at III.
226. See id.
227. See China Uses 'State Secret' Laws Against Dissidents, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
(Paris), June 23, 1995, availablein LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
228. See generally Amnesty International Urges Macau Leaders to Ensure Human
Rights, supra note 10.

229. See generally id. Mungoven believes that "concerns for human rights in the tiny
Portuguese enclave have been overshadowed by worries over Hong Kong's hand over to
China." Id. Fearing that Macao may become vulnerable to human rights abuses,
Mungoven urges that "Portuguese authorities must move quickly to secure human rights
here (Macau) and leave a legacy of human rights protection in law." Id.
230. See Drama and Politics in Macau, ASIAWEEK (Causeway Bay, H.K.), Sept. 4,

1998, at 8.
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The play portrayed the brutality with which the Portuguese
Government
handled a Chinese demonstration during the
23 1
1960s.
There is also concern for the rights and future status of the
Macanese, 232 a minority group comprised of 10,000 to 16,000
people. 233 Some Macanese have Portuguese passports and may
leave Macao if necessary. 234 Others plan to stay but are afraid that
the Chinese majority will discriminate against them.235 The
Macanese minority does not have a strong political voice in Macao
because it is internally divided on issues and has no strong
leader. 236 The Macanese worry that the strong Chinese presence
and influence will eventually shadow their existence, making them
second-class citizens.237 These worries are well founded because
official statistics do not even list them as Macanese; 238 the Joint
Liaison Group is considering classifying them as either Chinese or
Portuguese. 239 Although the Macao Basic Law purportedly
prohibits discrimination based on a person's "descent" or
"language," 240 the Macanese are nevertheless uncertain about
their future.
Macao's future stability depends on how the Macao Basic
Law is interpreted and implemented.
Autonomy, judicial
independence, and the human rights of Macao residents will likely
be the three issues dominating future dealings between the
Chinese and Macao Governments. To resolve these issues, both
sides first must recognize the differences in their respective legal
systems, political ideologies, and cultural traditions, and make a
good faith effort to abide by the spirit of the Macao Basic Law and
act in Macao's best interest.

231. See id.
232. The Macanese were among the earliest natives to occupy Macao. See Annabel
Jackson, Countdown for Culture in Crisis, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Quarry Bay, H.K.),

Feb. 8, 1998, at 2, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Basic Law of Macao ch. III, art. 25, reprinted in BEIJING REV., May 3-9, 1993,

supra note 3, at IV.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Macao transition deserves more attention from the
international community than it currently receives. Although
Macao is relatively small in size and economy, the legal and
political significance of the Macao hand over is great-it is another
test of the "one country, two systems" theory. The Macao
transition may reveal whether China is truly committed to political
democracy and human rights. Macao's unique history and social
culture make it more vulnerable to Chinese abuse and oppression
of human rights than was Hong Kong during the Hong Kong hand
over. The issues of designating an official language, localizing laws
and civil service systems, and controlling triad violence must be
resolved on grounds mutually beneficial to Macao and China.
Potential conflicts between the Central Government and the
MSAR concerning deploying troops, administrative and legislative
autonomy, judicial independence, and human rights protections
have just begun. At the center of the controversy is how the
Macao Basic Law will be interpreted and whether the Central
Government or the MSAR has the authority to interpret the law.
The final interpretation of the Macao Basic Law will determine
the future relationship between MSAR and the Central
Government.
This conflict gives rise to a new breed of conflict of laws
issues, namely, those arising when two competing government
entities with completely different respective legal systems occupy
one country simultaneously. Like the Hong Kong Basic Law,
Macao and the west may view the Macao Basic Law as Macao's
"mini-constitution." 24 1 The Standing Committee's overruling of
the Hong Kong immigration decision, however, clearly sends242a
message to Macao that this may not necessarily be the case.
The Chinese Government never intended the Basic Law to
function as the MSAR's "mini-constitution." Ultimately, if the
Basic Law is subject to the Standing Committee's discretionary
interpretation, the promises of autonomy, judicial independence,

241. Charlotte Ku, Introductory Note, Basic Law of Hong Kong, reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1520, supra note 182, at 1511 (stating that the Hong Kong Basic Law will serve as a "miniconstitution" governing the relationship between Hong Kong and China).
242. See Landler, supra note 189, at 13 ("the Chinese [G]overnment told Hong Kong's
top legal official ... that a landmark ruling on immigration by the high court here violated
the territory's constitution ....").
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and protection of fundamental rights under the Macao Basic Law
may not be kept. The Chinese Government should acknowledge
the historical, legal, and cultural differences between China and
Macao, respect Macao's cultural and legal traditions, and resolve
the differences in accordance with the spirit of the Macao Basic
Law.

